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Technological innovation:
Galbraith, the Post Keynesians,
and a heterodox future
Abstract: Galbraith, in his work on The New Industrial State, provides the cru-
cial institutional base from which to appreciate corporate technological inno-
vation. This approach is modified by the work of other institutional writers in
the context of changing industrial realities, including the rise of start-up entre-
preneurs. Post Keynesians have developed a monopoly capitalist research agenda
that implies certain important elements of human agency that institutionalists
have left unstated. Finally, this paper sketches out important elements of a fu-
ture heterodox analytical framework on innovation that incorporates
Galbraithian and Post Keynesian features for understanding corporate busi-
ness strategy and public policy management.
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Technological innovation is an extremely visible and politically charged
concept. When John Ettlie did a Web search (in February 1999) on the
scientific database of titles and abstracts in the business and economics
literature, he came up with 3,011 entries. A Web search of the same two
words in cyberspace produced 248,840 “hits” (Ettlie, 2000, p. 30). This
visibility is on the basis of much political debate on many issues related
to the positive and negative aspects of new technology. Evidence from
research on these issues is mixed and actually relates to how new tech-
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nology is managed in the economic environment in which it is being
introduced.
Technological innovation has many definitions in the innovation lit-
erature. For the purposes of this paper, the following is most appropriate:
the creation, development, and implementation of an idea from problem
solving or opportunity identification that alters (innovation) the current
state of theoretical and practical knowledge, skills, and artifacts in the
production and delivery of economic activity (technology). In the con-
text of innovation, technology matters because it is the engine that drives
change and economic growth. This is in response to society’s needs or in
the conceiving of new economic opportunities that induce demand. With-
out effective demand generating the commercialization of new technol-
ogy, the idea remains merely an invention without exploitation.
Underlying the incessant drive in capitalism to technological change
are the agency processes of technological innovation that introduce and
manage this change. These agency processes need to be clearly under-
stood and appreciated for policy relevance to the public, private, and
third (nonprofit) sectors. The economic analysis of technological inno-
vation is diverse and unsystematic. Scholarly works related to techno-
logical innovation have many ideological and functional intentions, and,
as a result, there is little intersection or dialogue between them. This
creates a problem for analyzing technological innovation per se. The
objective of this paper is to sketch a generic political economy frame-
work of analysis for technological innovation.
A political economy approach initiates this investigation by first re-
jecting the promarket perspectives (neoclassical and neo-Austrian) of
the individual capitalist-entrepreneur agent initiating and managing
change. John Kenneth Galbraith provides the initial critical perspective
from which to appreciate the development of large corporate agency in
technological innovation. Then, the Post Keynesian contribution pro-
vides a macroeconomic demand-oriented view of innovation that helps
to appreciate the economic development and volatility of modern
neoliberal capitalism. Finally, in the paper, the work of Galbraith and
the Post Keynesians informs a broader heterodox understanding of tech-
nological innovation for the more diverse capitalist future that applies in
the twenty-first century.
Political economy approach
The political economy approach adopted in this paper centers the inno-
vation decision-making processes of economic agents within institutions
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and how they react to the different levels of political power in society.
This approach ensures a critical analysis of technological innovation in
the economic environment in which both the positive and negative as-
pects of new technology are examined. The positive aspects of new tech-
nology have become a persuasive marketing tool, whereas the negative
aspects have become a source of dread (the “Frankenstein hypothesis”).
Common negative aspects are technological unemployment, informa-
tion (technology) poor, technological determinism, environmental
nonsustainability of new technology, false technological indestructibil-
ity (the “Titanic effect”), technological trade deficits in export commod-
ity-based countries, a long and unpredictable process of developing and
commercializing, labor deskilling and dehumanizing, and increasing
stress and social limits to technological growth.
The parameter that sets up this political economy approach is the dy-
namic model of technological change based on Marx’s laws of motion.
Essentially, the circulation process under capitalism must overcome the
limits of production by expanding over the barriers of declining addi-
tions to surplus value time (Lallier, 1989). This determines the drive to
technological innovation in three forms: (1) opening up new markets,
(2) creating new needs and demands, and (3) investment in increasingly
technologically efficient means of production. These forms are endog-
enously linked to instability, unemployment, inequality, and unsustain-
able development that create an economy with fundamental uncertainty.
In fact, it is the attempt to “control” this uncertainty that drives all agents
of innovation. The political economy “power to control” approach leads
to the rejection of the promarket—neoclassical and neo-Austrian—per-
spectives, which do not address this issue.
Crucially, the economic agents of institutions are the central decision-
making actors in the process of technological innovation. These agents
have the power to affect the way society adapts to such innovations in
three ways: (1) the ability to determine the nature of the technology
employed; (2) the monopoly power that resides with the entrepreneurs
who install the innovation that can stifle other innovations as well as
promote their own; and (3) the force society through organizational (poli-
tics), property (rights), and individual (charisma) elements to adopt the
innovations they promote. This power view of innovation has two di-
mensions. One is the power to manipulate production in a way that tech-
nological innovation alters the physical aspect of the economy. Adam
Smith, followed by Ricardo and Marx, developed this dimension around
specialization (Smith), employment (Ricardo), and exploitation (Marx)
on the basis of what happens to the economic surplus (Dasgupta, 1985,
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p. 15). Braverman (1974) applied this dimension to monopoly capital-
ism as it developed through the mass production age of the twentieth
century. The effects of technological innovation on the degradation of
work was the essential element identified in Braverman and carried out
further in the “deskilling” literature (see Callus and Quinlan, 1979). The
other dimension is the power to manipulate demand in a way that pro-
motes one innovation while stifling another. Sraffa (1926) first recog-
nized the power of marketing, which was subsequently developed by
many economists—notably, Galbraith (1958), Robinson (1933), and
Sylos-Labini (1962).1
The innovation process is the generation of ideas and their implementa-
tion (often called “commercialization” when it occurs in a private sector
business environment). Jolly (1997) calls this process of getting ideas
from the “mind to the market,” and he identifies in his research five inter-
connected stages in the process: imagining—which generates technological
solutions with problem-solving skills (invention); incubating—which
develops concrete applications of the technological solutions; demonstrat-
ing—which tests designs and validates outcomes of technological appli-
cations; promoting—which positions the demonstrated technology into
appropriate market(s); and sustaining—which improves functionality
through incremental improvements. The diverse bodies of literature that
discuss technological innovation emphasize different aspects of this five-
stage innovation process and recognition of this clarifies the political-
economic context in which the investigation below is conducted.
Galbraith and the critical institutional perspective
Heidegger (1977) identifies “laws” that drive capitalism to technologi-
cal innovation through a sequence of technical knowledge encapsulated
in technological trajectories. One technological development is instru-
mental in generating complementary innovations while destroying the
integrity of older technologies. This, however, should not be seen as
1
 Kingston (1984) provides (to my knowledge) the first attempt to synthesize these
two political economy dimensions to innovation.
2 Technological determinism has many different strands. Smith and Marx (1996), in
their introduction to their edited volume, categorize these strands across a spectrum
from “hard” to “soft.” The degree of human agency in the technological innovation
process increases from hard to soft. The neo-Schumpeterian school tends to be close
to the “hard” end as it works with mathematically identified technological trajectories.
For a sympathetic overview of this literature, see Bryant and Wells (1998). For a
critical evaluation, see Phillimore (1998).
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some mechanistic technological determinism.2 All technological change
is contingent on how technology is “shaped” by human agency pro-
cesses as social groups manage technological, social, and economic con-
flicts (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985).
The rise of big business in the twentieth century moved the dynamic of
agency away from the individual entrepreneur. Galbraith (1967), in The
New Industrial State (TNIS), provides a way of understanding this dy-
namic on technological innovation by recognizing the laws of motion
within the large corporations, but incorporating into this trajectory a strong
agency story. The agency that is central to the determination of techno-
logical innovation in TNIS is the technostructure. The technostructure is
seen as the decision-making basis of the large corporations, which forms
“the planning system” of advanced capitalist economies and which guides
economic development. This agency group embraces specialized knowl-
edge, talent, and experience in specific technology-based areas where
the market system (and its small enterprises) is symbiotically subservi-
ent to the decisions of large corporations, while governments need to
acquiesce to the planning system’s power and influence. TNIS devel-
oped this large-firm–dominance approach from Schumpeter (1942),
where the small-firm entrepreneur of Schumpeter (1911) gives way to a
managerial class who are concerned with protecting and supporting in-
creasingly sophisticated technology in a planned approach. Power lies
with the technostructure inside large corporations that serve partly the
capitalist-owners through share price and dividend sustainability, with
an increasingly generous serving to themselves via remuneration pack-
ages and perquisites of office (Stilwell, 2002, p. 232).
TNIS forms the basis of a critical institutional school response to the
power of big business, reaching back to the seminal early works of
Thorstein Veblen and linking with contemporaries like Clarence Ayres.3
Although clearly having an institutional focus, TNIS has a sophisticated
methodological inquiry that is evolutionary, emphasizing the role of major
institutions in shaping economic and social development. In the context
of technological innovation, it is the technostructure that is the major
agent of change that results in corporate dominance, environmental stress,
deep military–industrial complex, financial instability, as well as glo-
balized market and cultural penetration. All this can be described as an
3
 Ayers (1952) has been described as a strong case of technological determinism.
However, Lawson notes “on closer reading, as with Marx, the point that emerges is
that some technological development may be a necessary condition for some other
technological development (or indeed social development)” (2004, p. 5).
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interlocking complex set of innovation systems operating at global, na-
tional, and subnational (or regional) levels.4
The source of creativity in technological innovation is a double-edged
sword for the technostructure. The technology imperative demands from
the technostructure two actions. First, the technostructure needs to stifle
competing radical innovations from individual entrepreneurs of the classic
neo-Austrian variety (see Lessig, 2004). Second, the technostructure
needs to commit funds for internal research and development (R&D) in
the incremental innovations of existing corporate technologies (see
Chiesa, 2001). These two actions tend to limit innovation to what a bu-
reaucracy can produce in a planned system. Schumpeter (1942) expresses
concern that the dynamism of innovative entrepreneurship will be eroded
by the technostructure sheltering their large corporations from “the gales
of creative destruction.”
The large corporation bridges internally the investment–innovation gap
by first funding R&D and then commercializing the projects that are
deemed by the technostructure as having the potential for success (see
Jolly, 1997). This leads to circular and cumulative causation,5 where the
dynamic forces of innovation support certain forms of innovation to the
detriment of other innovations. Self-perpetuation through monopoly
control in the physical dimensions of innovation leads to a virtuous cycle
of incremental innovation by large corporations. This is perpetuated in
MBA courses that develop models for managing technological innova-
tion (e.g., Ettlie, 2000). On the other hand, there is also the vicious cycle
of disadvantage, prejudice, and legal constraints that prevent the invest-
ment–innovation gap from being met by small start-ups through funds
and other assistance. Support to traverse this gap does not easily trickle
down to small innovative entrepreneurs (see Kingston, 1984; Lessig,
2004).
Galbraith (1958) develops the concept of producer sovereignty to re-
place consumer sovereignty—the neoclassical term to express consumer
choice in the market. Under a planning system, the large corporation
needs to reduce fundamental uncertainty of new innovations by chan-
neling huge resources into market research (or “wants–creation” pro-
cess) and developing a marketing plan that creates product acceptance
and brand loyalty. This is the promotion aspect of innovation that has
4
 For an outline of complex economic dynamics, using the new complexity method-
ology, see Rosser (1999).
5
 This concept was originally outlined by Veblen and developed across a broad
range of issues by Gunnar Myrdal (see Argyrous, 1996).
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been developed by the critical institutionalists who have followed
Galbraith, and it implies an acceptance of a strong consumerist ethos as
a necessary precondition for producer sovereignty to work in the aggre-
gate. There will always be specific examples of failures in marketing,
but its overall success is evident from the continual development of con-
sumerism both in advanced economies and now spreading through to
strongly developing economies such as China.6 Galbraith often quips:
“It is the exception that proves the rule.”
Another cumulative causation aspect emerges with the role of invest-
ment and effective demand in innovation. Heilbroner identifies that
capitalism’s investment rests on the shoulders of technological progress
alone, which carries with it an inherent instability:
The great inventive contributions of mankind had always come in sud-
den bursts: an era of industrial revolution; an era of railroadization; an
era of electrification; another of automotive building [and yet another era
of information technology building]. Each cluster of inventions had re-
sulted in a spurt of investment, but when each had run its course, the
hectic activity of building was succeeded by a period of quiescence. (1961,
<<page>>)
This instability of innovation has been dubbed the “clust–bun” effect;
clustering of inventions leads to bunching of investment to intensify
existing business cycle activity. The virtuous “clust–bun” effect requires
effective demand stimulus through widespread diffusion of the cluster-
ing phenomenon that can only be achieved through the availability of
profits for investment, or through public sector funding.7
Impediments to the “clust–bun” effect reside in the institutional frame-
works of nations (national innovation systems [NIS]), particularly those
with still-dominant mature industries utilizing older technologies (Free-
man and Perez, 1988, pp. 58–65). Increased uncertainty arising from
large investment in the new technology systems also adds an impedi-
ment through increased macroeconomic volatility, which Toivanen et
al. (1999) empirically identify as slowing down the diffusion process.
R&D (and technology transfer thereof) provides large corporations with
the potential means to overcome these impediments and set up their own
6
 For an evaluation of Galbraith’s work as it applies to fundamental uncertainty, see
Dunn (2001). For a psychology-based research that supports producer sovereignty
and the consumerist context, see Kahneman (1999).
7
 See Courvisanos and Verspagen (2004) for empirical support on the “clust–bun”
effect.
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NIS, with profits determining the volume of R&D that firms can under-
take. Thus, the size of firms will reflect how successful the technostruc-
ture is in overcoming impediments in their own terms. The greater this
success, the larger and stronger monopoly control will be exerted by
large corporations. Then, there would be less space for small enterprises
to prosper, unless they are symbiotically linked to the large corporations
(e.g., component makers for automobiles and computers). This provides
a clear and consistent adaptation and modification to Galbraith’s tech-
nostructure concept in light of capitalist developments in technological
innovation since the publication of TNIS.
The cumulative causation process has a regional inequality dimension
to it. So, firms that cluster in one industrial location, strongly supported
by one or a few large corporations, create strong regional innovation
systems (e.g., Saxenian, 1994). Meanwhile, peripheral industrial regions
without large and expanding corporations will tend to lose their entre-
preneurial people to strong cluster regions. This is what Myrdal (1957,
p. 27) calls the “backwash effects” in regional economies, from an eco-
nomic development perspective.
The role of government in technological innovation from the institu-
tional perspective is strongly based on Galbraith’s interventionist posi-
tion. The power imbalance in monopoly capitalism clearly needs to be
addressed by reformist public policies that aim to provide more bal-
anced development by supporting regions, industries, unions, commu-
nities, and innovators that do not have the support of the technostructure.
The innovation policies need to be active and positive in the direction of
encouraging variety, fostering experimental behavior, supporting new
developments, focusing on system building, enhancing diffusion, pro-
moting learning organizations and their skills training, as well as assist-
ing to influence expectations (through grants, tax concessions, mentoring,
supporting business services).8
Galbraith’s major contribution is the holistic approach to analysis and
policy, recognizing interdependencies within dynamic forces. This foun-
dation leads to complex economic dynamics that can identify systemic
(rather than market) failure and interventionist policies to overcome such
failures. Many examples of success in this innovation approach can be
noted: war-based economy, reconstruction from major devastation (e.g.,
the Marshall Plan), national sports-based academies, and regional clus-
8
 Modern neo-Schumpeterian economists spell out such policies in detail (see
Bryant and Wells, 1998). For a neo-Schumpeterian overview from one of its leading
lights, see Nelson (1987).
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tering around universities and technology parks. Three major criticisms
can be identified: (1) Given the large monopoly planning power of the
technostructure, it is unclear how a government can escape from their
acquiescent policy framework into the more balanced approach advo-
cated by Galbraith. In fact, this planning power will ensure that any
“balanced” attempts will be skewed to favor the large corporations
through special interest lobbying and pleas by neoclassical economists
of the erroneousness of profligate state spending on picking “winners.”
(2) The vast majority of job-creating companies are fast-growing inno-
vative start-ups (or gazelles), independent of the technostructure (Birch
et al., 1999), especially with the downsizing of large corporations through
the 1990s. (3) Affluent electoral majorities in advanced capitalist econo-
mies are enjoying the fruits of a consumerist society and no longer look
to government for social betterment of society in a balanced way, but
instead demand security to protect their materialist gains from what
Galbraith calls “the underclasses” that exist both inside and outside na-
tional borders (see Lasch, 1995).
A variant of the institutional school, inspired by Penrose (1959), is the
strongly empirically oriented resource-based view (RBV) of the firm.9
This view could be incorporated into the Galbraithian analysis of tech-
nological innovation to address the criticisms outlined above. Penrose
identifies the precise circumstances and actions of the firms that deter-
mine innovation champions. Scherer warned 25 years ago that “the search
for a firm size uniquely and unambiguously optimal for invention and
innovation is misguided” (1980, p. 418). There is strong theory and evi-
dence to support both small and large firm innovation propensity. In
fact, medium-sized firms tend to be the most disadvantaged, because
they lack the dynamism of small entrepreneurship and the wherewithal
of large firms to conduct R&D. However, “unequivocal evidence is found
that [market] concentration exerts a negative influence on the number of
innovations being made in an industry” (Acs and Audretsch, 1991, p.
14). This means that innovations can emerge as much from small firms
as from large firms, thus industrial and regulatory policies cannot be
9
 Despite this empirical disposition, the RBV uses many measures and they are all
acknowledged as unsatisfactory, especially in trying to identify innovations them-
selves and the core competencies that create them (Acs and Audretsch, 1991). Core
competencies can also be limiting when they become core rigidities, and then firms
underestimate or neglect emerging core competencies arising in the economy. This
leads to ignoring market demand, leading to the problem of effective demand and its
limitation on innovation.
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based on simple rules about firm size but more related to market power
through high concentration in particular industries. In general, this im-
plies that the role of government needs to be active and supportive (e.g.,
removing monopoly rents).
Collaborations between firms are a crucial element of the learning pro-
cess in RBV, and empirical studies have identified the technological and
marketing innovative benefits that emerge (see Coombs et al., 1996).
Networking from collaborations by (and with) small and large firms has
significant implications for regional clusters (or industrial milieux) both
in geographic and cyberspace. In this way, innovation diffuses over space
through the process of knowledge spillovers that operate at different
rates of diffusion across technology gaps. The laws of motion that RBV
concentrates on relates to the evolution of technological innovation. The
initial approach was the life cycle (or S-curve) from birth to decay (or
transition). Since then, more sophisticated approaches have emerged for
large firms, particularly punctuated equilibrium and jolt theory; whereas
small firms still tend to resemble Alfred Marshall’s “forest of firms.”10
RBV has a distinct lack of analysis of market power in the innovation
process, despite the occasional reference to market concentration strength
as a negative influence on innovation. Thus, from the political economy
approach, the empirically rich RBV can only supplement the strongly
power-based Galbraithian analysis. One aspect that could reflect a fresh
RBV angle on power is the neglected notion of an “innovation mecha-
nism” by Downie (1958), “whereby laggard firms have a greater incen-
tive (the need to survive) to undertake risky R&D work that might provide
them with ways to re-establish their competitive position” (Bloch and
Finch, 2004, p. 12).
The Post Keynesian contribution
A macroeconomic perspective on the technological innovation process
is lacking in Galbraith and the institutional school. Their emphasis is on
the industrial organization of innovation as a critical response to the
10
 This is the biological analogy of firms as trees, where they “gradually lose vital-
ity; and one after another they give place to others, which . . . have on their side the
vigor of youth” (Marshall, 1920, p. 316). This implies that firms do grow, but then
decay, so that no firm becomes too large over a long time so as to dominate the indus-
try. The role of regional clustering and industrial location is linked to this biological
need to group together in order to be sustainable. This sustainability is only in a
quasi-equilibrium state such that there is “dynamic balance between progressive and
declining firms, with today’s progressives inevitably becoming tomorrow’s decliners”
(Bloch and Finch, 2004, p. 5). For empirical support, see Ettlie (2000, pp. 76–82).
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neoclassical microeconomic market faith. Galbraith’s own Keynesian
predilections gave him a strong effective demand macroeconomic view,
but this has never been wedded to his technostructure and the political
economy of technological innovation. A small group of economists
working in the Kalecki–Steindl tradition have made a significant contri-
bution to the macroeconomic demand-oriented aspects of technological
innovation that helps to appreciate the economic development and vola-
tility of modern neoliberal capitalism. On the scale of technological de-
terminism, this contribution is further to the soft end than the institutional
school because of its emphasis on the power of capitalists’ own behav-
ioral decision making.
The agency that is central to the Post Keynesian determination of tech-
nological innovation is the “capitalist.” The capitalist links innovation
to investment decision making so that the elements of effective demand
and cyclical volatility at the broad base are related to the cumulative
processes in all forms of innovation at the firm/industry level. This per-
spective derives from Keynes (1936) and his clear view that investment
(in capital stock) is the essential, but “undependable” drive wheel for
the economy. Coprogenitor of the Post Keynesian perspective, Michal
Kalecki, identifies historically determined profit levels as generating the
ability to invest in capital goods and in innovation knowledge enhance-
ment. Profits (or surpluses in nonprofit organizations and public authori-
ties) not only provide the wherewithal to invest but, through their
extension of the capital funds owned by the organization (“entrepre-
neurial capital”), it also allows for access to loans and share issues
(“rentier capital”), which can further extend capital and knowledge-based
investment (Kalecki, 1991, p. 279).
Capital accumulation is embedded in the endogenous (or induced) in-
novation generated from within the organizations (via R&D expendi-
ture and knowledge spillovers). Such innovation is of secondary
importance from the scientific standpoint, coming as it does from:
(1) slight adaptations on previous capital equipment, (2) cosmetic im-
provement in old products, and (3) extension of previous raw material
sources. Kalecki calls the “innovation effect” a “development factor,”
which creates the following dynamic process:
innovations prevent the system from settling to a static position and en-
gender a long-run upward trend. The accumulation of capital, which re-
sults from the fact that long-run investment is above the depreciation
level, in turn increases the scope of the influence of the development
factors and thus contributes to the maintenance of the long-run trend.
(ibid., p. 327)
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Kalecki, then, sees “exogenous” innovation as representing the inten-
sity of innovation with given capital investment levels. This means that
any change in the intensity of the innovation effect originates in the
scientific invention or basic business opportunity identified as the source
of the innovation. So that a “reduction in the intensity of innovations . . .
will also initially cause a disturbance in the cyclical fluctuation and, by
means of a slump more pronounced than the boom, will make for a lower
long-run level of investment” (ibid., p. 328).
This would lower the long-run trend, where an increase in innovation
intensity would raise the long-run trend in economic growth. Such an
approach has close links to the Schumpeterian “clust–bun” effect and
how innovation intensity varies with clustering and its impediments.
R&D amounts in aggregate to a large body of investigation going on
continuously (at different rates of intensity). This large R&D spending
and related innovation effects are bound to lead to some major new “dis-
covery” or “invention,” which is related to the total aggregate R&D,
rather than any particular one R&D project. This discovery is linked to
possible small developments in various laboratories and informal net-
works between firms and industries, eventually coming to fruition in
some way divorced of any specific competitive behavior. New techno-
logical paradigms come out of such aggregate developments and are the
basis of structural change to a new long wave of boom and prosperity
(Freeman and Perez, 1988, pp. 47–58). Changes in technological sys-
tems and paradigms arise only after all the minor improvements (endog-
enous innovation) are squeezed out of the old systems and paradigms by
“monopoly capital” entrepreneurs who want to protect existing capital
stock and delay the new paradigm taking over. There is also “logjam” in
endogenous innovations based on the new paradigm, which compounds
the latter’s slow initial adoption. This occurs when established powerful
capitalists, with much old capital stock, cannot justify the entire shake-
up of industries, since not enough interrelated clusters have been formed.
This approach to R&D places the technostructure into a broader capital-
ist context that reflects the stronger clustering of innovations that has
been developed by large corporate interests since publication of TNIS.
As the institutional framework slowly adapts to the new technological
system, capitalists’ reactions against uncertainty of profits come from
competitive pressures and growing inefficiencies of old capital stock.
This induces adaptation (by industries) and imitation (within industries)
to technological trajectories that are totally new, establishing the new
investment upturn. It creates a new investment boom and, at the same
time, reestablishes the conditions for a new phase of steady develop-
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ment. A paradigm shift occurs when the new adapted technological sys-
tems pervade the whole economy.
This analysis links together the two types of innovations described by
Baran and Sweezy (1966)—namely, “normal” (or endogenous) and “ep-
och-making” (or exogenous). A period of secular decline in economic
development can now be associated with the limitations of scale produc-
tion in oligopolistic competition, as the old technology systems are run-
ning out of possible new adaptations. Diffusion of the old systems through
endogenous innovation slows down and imitators become considerably
fewer. The large powerful corporations attempt to protect existing capi-
tal values and ignore the new technological systems being developed on
the fringe of the corporate world. This tends to exacerbate the mismatch
between new technologies and a powerful institutional framework based
around monopoly capital. It was Steindl, back in 1952, who inspired this
type of stagnation analysis that arises from intraindustry competition.
He recognized this secular decline as the incentive to reduce surplus
capacity and invest in established and mature monopoly capital sectors.
However, in his 1976 introduction to the 1952 book reprint, Steindl stated
that he was “ready to admit a possibility which I denied in my book: that
it might be the result of exhaustion of a long technological wave” (1976,
p. xv). This raises the question of how the new wave of technological
innovation develops.
Shapiro explores technological innovation using the Steindl model of
competition in two papers. Shapiro (1981) identifies Steindl’s progres-
sive firms as the large corporations with strong saving out of profits that
are prepared to support their technostructure in innovation-based invest-
ment in R&D, means of production (processes), and new product devel-
opment. These progressive firms have the ability to develop substantially
new products on the “wave” of a new technological system in process
innovation. The most recent example of a process innovation that has
spawned a large product innovation phase is information technology
(IT). As Kingston (1984) recognizes, the marketing of an innovation
needs to follow the initial technological accumulation process, and the
Post Keynesian perspective can explore in much detail the crucial de-
mand-creating nature of marketing new product development. Shapiro
(1981) identifies conditions that determine whether capitalists will pre-
fer investment in their present mature industries (intraindustry competi-
tion) or diversify into new industries developed by smaller innovative
start-ups. New industry innovation through interindustry competition is
explained in Shapiro (1986), when large firms diversify into markets not
“clogged” up by oligopoly. This enhances these firms’ own growth pros-
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pects as well as developing an acceleration of aggregate growth if the
diffusion of the new technological innovation becomes widespread.
Eichner (1976) describes this innovation process as the form of compe-
tition that drives large corporations while endogenously “oligopolizing”
new industries.11
Monopoly capitalism suffers from systemic failures of stagnation or
instability, depending on the combined effects of oligopoly innovation
and investment decisions. From this Post Keynesian analysis of innova-
tion, Courvisanos specifies the need for three public policies: (1) de-
mand management to regularize investment cycles at the macroeconomic
level, (2) encouraging innovation into new technological systems at the
microeconomic level, and (3) “socialization of investment” through per-
spective planning at the mesoeconomic level as countervailing power to
the planning system of monopoly capital (1996, pp. 225–230). Such poli-
cies allow governments to match or counterplanning decisions made in
the corporate sector.
The technostructure and its accompanying institutional forces and in-
novation systems allows one to understand the physical production side
of innovation. The Post Keynesian contribution provides a potent de-
mand-oriented response to innovation issues set within the dynamics of
oligopoly-based competition. However, not being able to identify and
explain entrepreneurial start-ups (à la neo-Austrian) and strategic col-
laborations (à la RBV) in the innovation process opens up the criticism
of Post Keynesian that despite the appropriate demand conditions and
public support, without these two dynamic elements of firm innovation,
the innovation process could be heavily stymied as it was during the
command economy period of Eastern European economies (see
Marangos, 2004).
A heterodox future
The role of power in technological innovation is central to any complete
endogenous account of business and economic development. The
promarket (neoclassical and neo-Austrian) perspectives are limited in
their analysis of power to the role of the entrepreneur within some ab-
stract notion of the market. This lacks the contextual reality of monopoly
capitalism and how this distorts the entrepreneurial decision making into
11
 See also Thomson (1986). For a recent restating of this Post Keynesian position
on competition, see Shapiro (2003, pp. 65–67).
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innovation. Essentially, what is lacking is a political economy context.
Galbraith was instrumental in introducing such a political economy con-
text through agency of the technostructure in the innovation process.
This has been modified and adapted by many institutional-based econo-
mists since Galbraith, but without resolving the three major dilemmas
(skewed power, innovative start-ups, and consumerism). The Post
Keynesian contribution comes at the political economy innovation issue
from another direction entirely, examining agency of monopoly capital-
ists in the accumulation process through dynamic competition. The hard
end of technological determinism tends to limit the agency power of the
technostructure in the context of less monolithic and subtler monopoly
capitalism regimes that are developing in the early twenty-first century.
These more complex aspects have been developed by the Post Keynesian
and RBV views, providing more ontological human agency (or the soft
end) to technological determinism.
The diverse, and often incompatible, analytical tools and processes
used to explain technological innovation in the scholarly works described
in this paper means that there is no clear political economy path to praxis
within the modern capitalist economy. This was the concern raised by
Kingston in 1984 by his insightful but largely ignored book, and it still
remains 20 years later. Technological innovation has had enough diver-
gent approaches, what this issue needs is a heterodox future that com-
bines and integrates the important themes running through these critical
approaches.12
A heterodox synthesis needs to provide a strong generic framework to
understand and appreciate the capitalist forces that underlie technologi-
cal innovation and its commercialization process. A deeper policy analysis
that emerges could form the basis of appreciating the corporate planning
system and its implications for public policy strategies. This could also
provide improved ability for entrepreneurs, workers, public servants,
and politicians to cope with the uncertainty that arises from the dynam-
ics of technological innovation and accompanying capital investment.
At the same time, this generic framework can be used to take advantage
of the susceptibility of other firms in a dynamic competitive environ-
ment in order to innovate and develop competitive strengths. Finally,
12
 The heterodox interface has become an important part of communication among
many nonneoclassical schools of economics—in an effort to develop dialogue, learn
from alternative approaches, and find common threads of analysis. For example, the
inaugural conference of the International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism
in Economics (ICAPE), University of Missouri, Kansas City, June 2003.
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and crucially, such a framework enables some rigorous guidelines to be
established for further empirical research on the political economy of
technological innovation.
Any heterodox synthesis needs to contextualize the innovation pro-
cess within an institutional setting that is realist and relevant. In TNIS,
Galbraith provides a holistic and interdependent innovation system, cen-
tered on the technostructure and the power of large corporations. As a
start, the institutional contributions that follow Galbraith should provide
a foundation to this political economy heterodox approach. The Post
Keynesian contribution has strong dynamic and market-based themes
that are lacking in the Galbraithian perspective and need to be included.
The following elements should be built on the Galbriathian structure:
• Endogeneity: The concept that innovation arises from within the
systematic model constructed is the relevant perspective devel-
oped by Galbraith’s institutional setting and implicit in the Post
Keynesian profit-based investment analysis. The dynamics of a
complexity model with recursive effects and increasing returns
should be the feature of a heterodox framework.
• Uncertainty: There needs to be some mechanism that attempts to
“manage” the problem of uncertainty, pervasive as it is in the in-
novation process. The neoclassical and neo-Austrian perspectives
have mechanisms that assume the change agents can handle un-
certainty automatically. The institutional and Post Keynesian per-
spectives are more open-ended, identifying various political and
social elements that “manage” uncertainty through power and in-
fluence. Complexity dynamics is the most effective way to model
this uncertainty into a heterodox framework.13
• Evolutionary: The concept that innovation is a process of change
that evolves from some embryonic revolutionary idea to different
types of innovation: infant (radical), growth (incremental), matu-
rity (stagnant), and then either decline or transition (diversify).
Both institutional and Post Keynesian perspectives support this
concept.
• Individualism: The concept that innovation requires some one per-
son (or a team) to drive the innovation process through entrepre-
neurship. The process can be based on competitive or collaborative
arrangements in the commercialization of the innovation. The Post
Keynesian perspective tends to imply that it exists without focus-
13
 See Courvisanos and Richardson (2004) for an attempt at complexity modeling.
05 courvisanos.pmd 8/2/2005, 6:45 PM100
GALBRAITH,  THE  POST  KEYNESIANS,  AND  A  HETERODOX  FUTURE 101
ing on the elements that make it work. Galbraith’s technostructure
is the corporate team-based approach, whereas the RBV and neo-
Austrians have a stronger human agency element.
• Strategic planning: The concept that the innovation process needs
to be managed and strategized in a planned approach is a strong
antidote to the idea that it just happens by the power of individual-
ism. Both institutional and Post Keynesian perspectives support
this concept. Neoclassical economics ignores this concept com-
pletely, with even the neo-Austrians discussing the role of strate-
gic routines in innovation.
• Investment: The central Marxian concept of capital stock driving
the innovation permeates both institutional and Post Keynesian
perspectives. Neoclassical economics sees investment only as some
automatic response to market signals. Empirical evidence on the
basis of sound Keynesian principles shows that investment deci-
sion making needs to be analyzed explicitly, ideally using a basic
Post Keynesian foundation.14
• Supportive state policy: The need for public policy to support the
innovation process. The institutional response is strong in terms
of political economy and the need for reformist active interven-
tion, despite the fundamental contradiction identified earlier. Post
Keynesians have strong active support but without the political-
institutional depth of Galbraith. Some studies have combined in-
stitutional and Post Keynesian elements into a public policy
framework to address these political economy concerns.15
Conclusion
By examining critically the economics of technological innovation
through the prism of power and politics, the industrial and political re-
alities of dynamic economic development can be better appreciated. By
identifying what Galbraith and the Post Keynesian can contribute to a
heterodox synthesis on technological innovation, a framework for un-
derstanding corporate business strategy and public policy management
can be offered. The framework is only a thumbnail sketch, hopefully
14
 See Courvisanos (1996).
15
 See Courvisanos and Verspagen (2004), Freeman and Perez (1988), and Lima
(2000).
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providing the basis for further research into a substantial political
economy model of technological innovation.
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